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This paper empirically investigates the role of institutional framework in promoting 
bilateral trade through a regional trade agreement (RTA), namely the South Asian Free Trade 
Area (SAFTA), using an institutions-augmented gravity model. Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) estimation technique is used (performed) for a panel of 11 countries over 
the period 1996-2015. The initial estimation results suggest that this RTA is not effective in 
promoting regional trade in South Asia. Further empirical analysis reveals that SAFTA 
contributes significantly to bilateral trade when the impact of institutions is controlled for. The 
key policy lesson emerging from the analysis is that, given weak institutional structure, a 
regional agreement may not produce the desired results. Successful trade reforms depend on 
the institutional framework of the countries involved. Therefore, government should develop 
institutions to reap the potential benefits of RTAs.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent debate emphasises institutional reforms and regional integration as a means 
to achieve long term sustainable development. Appropriate institutions can lead to higher 
development by promoting investment in human and physical capital, and also by 
inducing innovations through trade (Nawaz, 2015). Regional integration is often 
considered an effective strategy to stimulate intra-regional trade and economic 
development. It creates larger markets and new business opportunities for producers and 
generates a greater level of domestic and foreign investment. It is a way to support the 
reallocation of resources and the development of regional production networks, which in 
turn support regional connectivity (Islam, Salim, & Bloch, 2016; Jouanjean, te Velde, 
Balchin, Calabrese, & Lemma, 2016). It allows free access to regional markets, ensures 
reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, promotes intra-regional trade and investment, 
and hence, economic development (Akhter & Ghani, 2010; Iqbal & Nawaz, 2017; 
Jaumotte, 2004; Kubny, Mölders, & Nunnenkamp, 2011).  
These arguments have created an exponential increase in regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) in recent decades.
1
 According to the World Trade Organisation 
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(WTO), around 459 RTAs are notified and implemented across the world as of August 
2018.
2
 The most successful RTAs are the European Union (EU), the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). These regions have shown a significant increase in intra-regional trade after 
signing these agreements. For example, a 25 percent increase in intra-regional trade 
among the ASEAN countries, and a 60 percent increase within the EU, is noted.
3
 These 
successful RTAs provide a basis for recommending regional integration in developing 
regions like South Asia.  
South Asian economies established a platform for regional cooperation, called 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), to promote regional 
prosperity and trade.
4
 The SAARC members signed South Asian Free Trade Area 
(SAFTA) in 2004, enforced in 2006, to boost bilateral trade. Apart from SAFTA, 
numerous bilateral trade agreements have been signed among member countries. 
However, it is evident that South Asia fails to reap the potential benefits of regional 
integration, despite signing multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. South Asia, with 
21 percent of the world population, is the least economically integrated part of the world, 
despite shared history, culture, and trade potential. Intra-regional trade here constitutes 
less than 5 percent of total trade volume compared to East Asia’s 35 percent and 
Europe’s 60 percent, while intra-regional investment is smaller than 1 percent of overall 
investment (Kathuria & Shahid, 2017). Recent studies have also shown that SAFTA 
failed to create any significant increase in regional trade in the South Asian region 
(Dembatapitiya & Weerahewa, 2015; Iqbal & Nawaz, 2017). This begs the question 
“What are the underlying factors that make SAFTA ineffective?”  
Recent literature shows that political differences and weak regulatory framework 
have had a negative impact on intra-regional trade in South Asia (Kathuria & Shahid, 
2017). Iqbal and Nawaz (2017) argue that regional integration becomes effective if and 
only if RTAs are supported by democratic institutions. This also highlights the role of 
institutions in ensuring the effectiveness of free trade policies.  
Institutions can promote trade and development through multiple channels. Good 
quality institutions induce specialisation, competitiveness, market expansion and 
technological advancement through reduced transaction costs. Transaction costs are 
incurred by the entrepreneur in terms of time, effort, and resources to define, protect and 
enforce agreements and property rights (Nawaz & Khawaja, 2018; North, 1990). Lack of 
information is an obstacle to establishing and expanding businesses. Well defined 
institutions ensure the accessibility of relevant information. Better quality institutions, 
such as contract enforcement and law and order, lead to lower transaction costs, hence 
more economic development and better trade opportunities through specialisation and 
competitiveness. Lower transaction costs provide a conducive environment for business 
expansions through innovation and adoption of new technologies. 
This study argues that institutional framework is the main factor which defines the 





4Member states are: (i) Afghanistan, (ii) Bangladesh, (iii) Bhutan, (iv) India, (v) Maldives, (vi) Nepal, 
(vii) Pakistan and (viii) Sri Lanka. 
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and development. Intra-regional trade is limited due to mistrust, political tension, and 
cross-border conflicts; hence, an integrated institutional framework is required to boost 
trade stemming from regional economic cooperation and integration. However, the scope 
of that study is relatively limited in that only democratic institutions are considered. 
Existing literature suggests that a variety of institutions may support trade and 
development (Nawaz, 2015).  
A detailed study is therefore required to examine the role of different institutions 
in promoting bilateral trade. The available literature primarily uses ordinary least square 
(OLS) with fixed effects to estimate gravity models. However, recent literature has 
argued that standard OLS technique may produce upward-biased estimates, while the 
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation technique may produce more 
reliable and robust results (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 2010, 2011).  
To fill the gaps in existing literature, the present study investigates the role of 
the institutional framework in promoting bilateral trade within SAFTA, using an 
institutions-augmented gravity model. This study extends the standard gravity model 
by incorporating institutions as well as the presence/absence of SAFTA in an 
augmented gravity model. Different types of institutions are used to explain the 
nexus between regional trade agreements and bilateral trade. The empirical analysis 
is performed using the PPML estimation technique for a panel of 11 countries over 
the period 1996-2015. The PPML estimation technique produces reliable and robust 
results compared to OLS with fixed effects (Afesorgbor, 2017; Silva & Tenreyro, 
2006).  
The paper is presented as follows:  
Section 2: Stylised facts  
Section 3: A brief overview of existing literature  
Section 4: The modelling framework  
Section 5: Data and estimation procedure  
Section 6: Empirical results and discussion 
Section 7: Conclusion with policy recommendations. 
 
2.  REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INSTITUTIONAL  
FRAMEWORK: STYLISED FACTS 
This section provides a comparative analysis of regional trade and institutional 
framework. According to the WTO, out of 673 RTAs signed as of August 2018, around 
459 RTAs are notified and implemented. The WTO counts RTAs based on notification 
rather than on the physical number of RTAs. For an RTA that includes both goods and 
services, WTO counts two notifications, i.e. one for goods, and one for services, despite it 
being physically one RTA.  
Around 287 “physical” RTAs are signed and implemented. The notion “Physical” 
RTA regroups them according to which goods and services aspects are notified 
separately. This includes both active RTAs—those still in force, and inactive RTAs– 
those that concluded in the past and are no longer in force. Figure 1 shows that every 
region in the world has signed physical RTAs. South Asian countries have signed 22 
physical RTAs with different countries and regions.  
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Source: (WTO, 2018). 
 
We find that intra-regional trade is high among East Asia & Pacific countries (50.2 
percent exports and 50.3 percent imports), Europe & Central Asia (69.8 percent exports and 
67.1 percent imports), and North America (30.7 percent exports and 18.7 percent imports). 
The overall intra-regional trade volume in South Asia, however, remains very low in spite of 
signing SAFTA. The region remains relatively un-integrated compared to other regions of the 
world despite shared history, culture, and borders. The regional trade share is very low, falling 
from 3 percent to 5 percent of total trade. Table 1 indicates that bilateral trade between South 
Asian countries remains low. India’s exports to South Asia are 6.7 percent only, while 
Pakistan has 12.8 percent exports. Similarly, imports are very low from other South Asian 
countries (Table 1). The major export destinations and import sources are located outside the 
region, comprising of both developed countries and fast-growing countries in East Asia. The 
USA, UAE, and China are three major export destinations for South Asian countries.  
 
Table 1 
Regional Trade Analysis (Within in Region) 
Region/Country Exports Imports 
East Asia & Pacific (EAP) 50.2 50.3 
Europe & Central Asia (ECA) 69.8 67.1 
Latin America & Caribbean (LAC) 15.6 13.9 
Middle East & North Africa (MENA) 13.0 10.0 
North America 30.7 18.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 29.6 16.7 
Others 0.4 3.0 
South Asia 7.0 2.4 
Trade in South Asia 
India 6.5 0.7 
Pakistan 12.8 4.6 
Afghanistan 70.8 11.5 
Sri Lanka 9.9 21.8 
Maldives 11.5 19.7 
Source: (World Bank, 2018a). 
 
5For composition of regions, see http://rtais.wto.org/userguide/User%20Guide_Eng.pdf. RTAs 
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Why have South Asian economies failed to develop bilateral trade despite shared 
history, culture, borders and regional integration initiatives? Apart from tariff and non-
tariff barriers, an unsatisfactory institutional framework may be a major hurdle to 
boosting trade. Table 2 shows how various regions and the individual South Asian 
countries rank among all the countries in the world according to several governance 
indicators. The highest rank is 100 indicating the highest quality, while the lowest is zero 
indicating the lowest quality. It is evident that South Asian economies ranked very low as 
compared to other regions of the world, especially East Asia & Pacific, North America, 
and Europe & Central Asia. 
 
Table 2 




Political Stability and 









EAP 66 65 53 51 57 56 
ECA 54 60 69 70 66 64 
LAC 66 60 54 55 50 54 
MENA 25 27 44 42 44 44 
North America 90 79 92 88 89 91 
SSA 33 32 26 28 30 31 
South Asia 36 30 37 29 36 34 
Afghanistan 21 1 10 7 4 3 
Bangladesh 31 10 25 22 31 21 
Bhutan 45 83 70 27 68 83 
India 59 14 57 41 52 47 
Maldives 26 60 41 35 36 29 
Nepal 39 19 20 24 20 24 
Pakistan 29 1 29 27 20 19 
Sri Lanka 43 50 45 51 54 48 
Source: (World Bank, 2018b). 
 
This discussion reveals the possibility that institutional bottlenecks may be the 
source of low trade volumes among South Asian countries despite their having numerous 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. These bottlenecks undermine the trade 
potential and divert trade to other regions and countries. 
 
3.  AN OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
In this section, we provide a snapshot of existing literature discussing the 
relationship between institutions, RTAs, and bilateral trade with reference to the South 
Asia region, especially SAFTA. Numerous studies have investigated the welfare gains 
and trade creation under RTA regimes for different parts of the world. 
Kurihara (2011) investigated the impact of RTAs on bilateral trade for OECD and 
non-OECD countries. This study finds that RTAs are more effective in OECD countries, 
as compared to non-OECD countries, in promoting trade. This study further argues that 
the potential effects of RTAs on bilateral trade vary among different regions and depend 
on the institutional arrangements of the participating economies.  
Bureau and Jean (2013) argue that bilateral trade can increase considerably 
through RTAs. This study finds that RTAs have a significant impact on pre-existing trade 
flows as well as on new trade flows. Carrere (2006) examined the impact of RTAs on 
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trade using a gravity model for 130 economies (developed and developing) for the period 
1962-1996 and found positive associations between RTAs and bilateral trade.  
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find that a free trade agreement (FTA) doubles 
bilateral trade between member countries after a period of 10 years. Recently, Afesorgbor 
(2017) examined the trade creation effects of African RTAs using meta-data analysis 
approach based on gravity model. This study concludes that African RTAs have a 
positive impact of about 27 percent-32 percent on trade.  
In the case of South Asia, various studies have shown that regional integration can 
be beneficial for all countries especially for India and Pakistan (Govindan, 1996; Pigato 
et al. 1997). Qamar (2005) says that Pakistan can benefit by entering a large market for 
its exports, while improving reserves significantly, by replacing relatively costly imports 
from the rest of the world with imports from India, under the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) status.  
Various studies argue that SAFTA is instrumental in boosting regional trade 
(Shaikh & Rahpoto, 2009; Shaikh, Syed, Shah, & Shah, 2012).  Shaikh and Rahpoto 
(2009) show that under the SAFTA arrangement, Pakistan can enjoy consumer surplus in 
exports of products like food items, cotton garments, dates, and leather. Using 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE), Shaikh et al. (2012) also found similar results. 
Recently a study shows that SAFTA is associated with an increase in bilateral trade flows 
within its member countries as well as between member and non-member countries 
(Regmi, Devkota, & Upadhyay, 2017). 
On the other hand, some studies have argued that SAFTA is not effective in 
promoting regional trade. They argue that SAFTA fails to expand regional trade, because 
SAFTA member economies are comparatively small. Furthermore, non-tariff restrictions 
among the member countries of SAFTA may cause trade diversion. Member countries 
are trading with countries that are not part of SAFTA, mainly developed regions like the 
USA, the EU and the Middle East (Baysan, Panagariya, & Pitigala, 2006).  
Akhter and Ghani (2010) find a negative association between SAFTA and bilateral 
trade using a gavity model approach. This study concludes that SAFTA may not be 
benefical in the short run but would be beneficial in the long run. Dembatapitiya and 
Weerahewa (2015) measure the impact of various bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements especially SAFTA and EU on bilateral trade using a gravity model. This 
study finds that SAFTA has an insignificant impact on bilateral trade in contrast with the 
EU, which has had a significant impact on bilateral trade (Dembatapitiya & Weerahewa, 
2015).  
Recently, Iqbal and Nawaz (2017) examined MFN and SAFTA on bilateral trade 
in South Asia. This study is based on a panel of eight countries from South Asia covering 
the period of 1975-2013. Standard gravity model is estimated using fixed effect model. 
This study finds that SAFTA and MFN have a positive but insignificant impact on 
bilateral trade. 
As to why RTAs are effective in a developed region like the EU and ineffective in 
developing regions like South Asia, the literature indirectly points to the ability of 
institutional arrangements to channel trade among member countries. Poor quality 
institutions act as a binding constraint on trade volumes. Anderson and Marcouiller 
(2002) empirically show that well defined institutions significantly increase trade in Latin 
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American countries. This study shows that high levels of corruption and the weak 
enforcement of contracts reduces international trade. Inefficient institutions constrain 
trade as much as tariffs do. Cross-country variations in the effectiveness of institutions 
offer reasons for disproportionate trade among developed and developing economies.  
De Groot, Linders, Rietveld, and Subramanian (2004) analyse the impact of 
institutions on trade. This study uses a gravity model to assess the impact of institutions 
on trade and finds that a better quality of formal institutions promotes bilateral trade. The 
estimates show that an increase in quality of institutions of one standard deviation causes 
an increase of around 30 percent to 44 percent in bilateral trade among trading partner 
countries (De Groot et al. 2004).  
Dutt and Trace (2010) measure the impact of corruption by the customs officials 
on bilateral trade using a corruption-augmented gravity model. This study finds a dual 
role of corruption in term of extortion and evasion and concludes that corruption acts as a 
hidden tax on trade when customs officials in the importing countries demand bribes 
from exporters. This so-called extortion effect reduces bilateral trade. On the other hand, 
if tariffs are high, corruption may induce bilateral trade when corrupt public officials 
allow exporters to escape tariffs by paying bribes (“evasion effect”).  
De Jong and Bogmans (2011) examine the relationship between institutions 
(institutional quality) and bilateral trade using the standard gravity model approach. This 
study finds that corrupt institutions decrease trade volume. Wu, Li, and Samsell (2012) 
investigate the effect of a country’s governance structure on trade. For this purpose, this 
study divides countries into three types based on mode of governance: (i) rules-based, (ii) 
relations-based, and (iii) family-based. This study finds that both rules-based and 
relations-based modes of governance impact positively on trade volumes, with rules-
based governance being the more effective(Wu, Li, & Samsell, 2012).  
Naanwaan and Diarrassouba (2013) analyse the impact of institutions, measured 
using an economic freedom index, on bilateral trade among 33 African countries, using 
an unbalanced panel and employing an augmented gravity model. The study found that 
improvement in both exporter and importer economic freedom indexes tends to generate 
more intra-regional bilateral trade. They argue that economic freedom comprises 
institutional arrangements that reduce transaction costs associated with international 
trade. The improvement in the quality of economic institutions helps to remove barriers 
that hamper intra-regional trade (Naanwaab & Diarrassouba, 2013).  
Francois and Manchin (2013) find that good-quality institutions have a significant 
positive impact on bilateral trade; showing that trade is linked with the institutional 
framework of the country. de Mendonça, Lirio, Braga, and da Silva (2014) investigate the 
impact of differences in institutional quality among economies on bilateral trade flows of 
agricultural products. This study applies the standard gravity model approach to a sample 
of 59 countries for the period 2005-2010 and concludes that institutions are important in 
explaining differences in trade volumes (de Mendonça, Lirio, Braga, & da Silva, 2014).  
The available literature clearly shows the importance of institutional parameters in 
promoting bilateral trade. Countries with well-defined and effective institutions can reap 
the potential benefits of regional integration. This current paper extends the existing 
literature by studying the role of institutions in a comprehensive way. Various 
institutional dimensions are used to establish the association between institutions, 
regional integration and bilateral trade.  
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4.  THE MODEL 
The theoretical framework to explain bilateral trade is based on a gravity model. 
The standard gravity model, introduced by Tinbergen (1962), is used to estimate the 
impact of economic development measured by GDP, and transaction costs measured by 
distance, on bilateral trade. The model predicts that bilateral trade among economies is 
positively linked with GDP (development/growth) and negatively related to costs of trade 
(Bergstrand, 1989). Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and 
Rubinstein (2008) provide comprehensive descriptions of the gravity model. The basic 
gravity model is as follows:  







𝜂𝑖𝑗 … … … … … … (1) 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is volume of trade from country 𝑖 to country 𝑗; 𝑌𝑖 and 𝑌𝑗 represent GDP of 
countries 𝑖 and 𝑗, respectively; 𝐷𝑖𝑗  denotes the distance in kilometres between the capital 
cities of two countries and 𝜂𝑖𝑗 indicates the error term with expectation equal to one. The 
standard approach of estimation for this equation is to take logs on both sides:  
ln⁡(𝑋𝑖𝑗) = 𝛽0+𝛽1ln⁡(𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2ln⁡(𝑌𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3ln⁡(𝐷𝑖𝑗)⁡+𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡  … … (2) 
Apart from 𝐷𝑖𝑗, common borders (𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗), common language (𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑗) and the 
condition of being landlocked (𝐿𝐿𝑖) are also used to comprehend trade cost. After adding 
these factors, the expanded version is as given below: 
 ln⁡(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽0+𝛽1ln⁡(𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2ln⁡(𝑌𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3ln⁡(𝐷𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4ln⁡(𝑃𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡  
               −𝑃𝐶𝑌𝑗𝑡)⁡+𝑏1(𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗) + 𝑏2(𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑗) + 𝑏3(𝐿𝐿𝑖) + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 … … (4) 
where (𝑃𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝐶𝑌𝑗𝑡) measures difference in GDP per capita of reporter and partner 
countries uses to test the existence of the Linder hypothesis, which is also called the 
“demand-similarity” hypothesis. The Linder hypothesis argues that the more similar the 
demand structures of countries, the more they will trade with one another (Borkakoti, 1998; 
Linder, 1961). CB is a dummy variable indicating a common border; CL is a dummy for 
common language; and LL is a dummy for being landlocked. Following the existing 
literature, this study incorporates institutions and regional integration in the model to 
quantify the impact of the institutional framework and regional integration on bilateral trade 
(Anderson & Marcouiller, 2002; De Groot et al. 2004; De Jong & Bogmans, 2011; de 
Mendonça et al. 2014; Dutt & Traca, 2010; Francois & Manchin, 2013; Iqbal & Nawaz, 
2017; Naanwaab & Diarrassouba, 2013). This study argues that institutions may have direct 
as well as indirect impact on bilateral trade (Yu, 2010). Literature shows that well defined 
and enforced institutions can promote trade indirectly by ensuring the implementation of 
free trade agreements like SAFTA (Iqbal & Nawaz, 2017).  
The augmented gravity model is as follows:  
 ln⁡(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽0+𝛽1ln⁡(𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2ln⁡(𝑌𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3ln⁡(𝐷𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4ln⁡(𝑃𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡  
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡−𝑃𝐶𝑌𝑗𝑡) + 𝑏1(𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗) + 𝑏2(𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑗) + 𝑏3(𝐿𝐿𝑖) + 𝜃1(𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝜃2 ln(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡)
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡+𝜃3 ln(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑗𝑡) + 𝜑1(𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡) ∗ ln⁡(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡) + 𝜑2(𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡) ∗ ln⁡(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑗𝑡)
 
+𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 … …. … … … … … (4) 
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where (𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡)⁡is a dummy variable for the existence of a RTA between two countries i.e. 
reporter 𝑖 and partner 𝑗, namely SAFTA; (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡) and (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑗𝑡) measure institutional 
quality index for the reporter country and the partner country respectively. This proposed 
model (Equation 4) is used to examine the impact of regional integration after controlling 
for institutional quality. It is expected that ∀𝜃 > 0 implying that regional integration and 
institutions have a positive impact on bilateral trade.  
To examine the complementarity between regional integration and institutions, an 
interactive term is also used. The coefficient 𝜑 captures the impact of regional integration 
after interacting with institutions. The Equation 4 shows that the marginal impact of 
regional integration on bilateral trade now explicitly depends on the value of institutions 
implying that: 
(i) ∆ln⁡(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝜃1 + 𝜑1ln⁡(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡) in case of reporter countries only 
(ii) ∆ln⁡(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝜃1 + 𝜑2ln⁡(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑗𝑡) in case of partner countries only 
On the other hand, the impact of institutions on bilateral trade depends on the 




|𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 1) = 𝜃 + 𝜑⁡and (
𝜕ln⁡(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝜕(𝐼𝑁𝑆)
|𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 0) = 𝜃; ∀𝜃 and ∀𝜑.  
 
5.  DATA DESCRIPTION AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1.  Data Description 
To estimate the impact of regional integration on bilateral trade, this study uses a 
panel of eleven countries. The focus of this study is limited to assessing the impact of 
SAFTA; hence, the choice of countries is primarily limited to SAFTA members and their 
close trading partners.
6
 The data span covers 1996-2015. The data on bilateral trade 
volumes are taken from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics (DOTS). Following the literature, data on bilateral trade are taken in current 
US$ (Carrere, 2006, Iqbal & Nawaz, 2017). The data on the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) at current US$ and GDP per capita in current US$ are retrieved from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database available online. The data on 
distances between countries, common borders, common language and being landlocked 
are taken from the “Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII)”
7
. The data for institutional quality are taken from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).  
To measure the impact of regional integration (𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡), this study uses dummy 
variable of SAFTA which is constructed as 1 if both reporting and partner countries are 
member of SAFAT and otherwise 0. Numerous studies have used similar method to 
construct regional integration variable (Iqbal & Nawaz, 2017; Jugurnath, Stewart, & 
Brooks, 2007). 
 
6The list of countries, with SAFTA members italicised, includes: (i) Afghanistan; (ii) Bangladesh; (iii) 
China; (iv) Indonesia; (v) India; (vi) Iran; (vii) Sri Lanka; (viii) Maldives; (ix) Malaysia; (x) Nepal; and (xi) 
Pakistan. Bhutan is excluded due to non-availability of data on bilateral trade.  
7 http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp 
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The institutional quality index (INS) is developed using the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) dataset. This data provides six different dimensions to capture 
institutional quality. These include:  (1) “Control of corruption” (CC); (2) “Government 
effectiveness” (GE); (3) “Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism” (PA); (4) 
“Regulatory quality” (RQ); (5) “Rule of law” (RL) and (6) “Voice and accountability” 
(VA). Each dimension falls within the range of –2.5 and +2.5. Where lower value means 
weak institutions and vice versa. Two types of institutional quality index are developed 
with two steps procedure. In first step, each indicator is normalised with range from 0 to 




(CC + GE + PA + RQ + RL + VA) ∗ 100 
To establish the robustness of results, weighted average series are also used to 
construct institutional quality index. Weights are calculated using the Principal 
Component Method (PCM). The first principal component that explains the maximum 
amount of variation is used to find the weight of each dimension. Following formula is 
used to construct final weighted institutional quality index:  
INSw =[(CC * 0.183) + (GE * 0.185) + (PA * 0.160) + (RQ * 180)  
         + (RL * 0.189) + (VA * 103)] * 100 
The economic development is measured using Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
GDP per capita in current US$. Differences in GDP per capita in current US $ between 
reporting and partner countries is used to measure the impact of Linder Hypothesis. The 
landlocked (LL) is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for landlocked countries otherwise 0. 
The common border (CB) is a dummy variable indicating 1 for common border otherwise 
0. The common language (CL) is a dummy for common language; 1 if both countries have 
same language, otherwise 0. The distance (D) is defined as the distance in kilometre 
between the capital cities of two countries. The dependent variable is bilateral trade. It is 
defined as total bilateral trade volume in current US$. The log transformation is applied on 




Variables Mean Std. dev Max Min Skewness Kurtosis 
LN(Xij) 18.72 3.34 25.39 4.44 -0.80 4.03 
LN(Yi) 25.18 2.22 30.03 19.93 -0.25 2.65 
LN(Yj)  25.18 2.22 30.03 19.93 -0.25 2.65 
D(LN(PCY)) 7.14 1.36 9.27 1.09 -0.93 3.85 
LN(D) 7.93 0.63 8.91 5.93 -1.12 3.91 
LL 0.18 0.39 1.00 0.00 1.65 3.72 
CL 0.05 0.23 1.00 0.00 3.92 16.39 
CB 0.20 0.40 1.00 0.00 1.50 3.25 
RI 0.19 0.39 1.00 0.00 1.57 3.47 
INSs  3.58 0.37 4.11 2.05 -1.75 7.31 
INSw 3.59 0.38 4.13 2.05 -1.72 7.14 
Source: Author’s own calculation. 
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5.2.  Estimation Methodology 
To estimate the proposed institutions augmented gravity model, this study has used a 
panel data estimation method. The use of panel technique in estimating effects is considered 
an effective procedure as it helps to enhance sample size and control unobservable factors and 
individual heterogeneity (Iqbal & Daly, 2014; Nawaz, 2015; Nawaz, Iqbal, & Khan, 2014; 
Nawaz & Khawaja, 2018). The standard method to estimate log-linearized gravity model is 
ordinary least squares (OLS). However, recent literature argues that interpretation of 
parameters of log-linearized model estimated by OLS as elasticities can be highly misleading 
in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 2010, 2011).  
This literature proposes Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator 
to estimate robust and reliable estimates of nonlinear gravity model. Based on this, the 
empirical analysis is performed using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
estimator. In log-linearised models, the PPML estimator produces more reliable and 
robust results than OLS with fixed effects; the PPML estimator provides consistent 
elasticity estimates even in the presence of heteroscedasticity. PPML estimators are 
robust to heteroscedasticity because the second or higher moment conditions are absent 
from the estimation procedure. PPML is consistent in the presence of fixed effect 
dummies and has several advantages over other estimators: it tackles heteroscedasticity, 
model misspecifications and zeros in data (Prehn, Brümmer, & Glauben, 2016).  
The PPML estimator is exactly equivalent to running a type of nonlinear least 
squares on the original equation, hence produces consistent estimates of the original 
nonlinear model. Empirical literature confirms that the PPML estimator produces robust 
estimates, even in the case of over dispersion and when the dependent variable has a large 
number of zeros (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006).  
To meet the Poisson model assumption of the conditional mean being proportional 
to the conditional variance, it is assumed that weights are proportional to the value of 
their observations and set exp(𝑋𝛽) 𝑋 = 𝑋. These weights are attached to the residuals of 
country pairs. This assumption coincides with the first-order conditions of the Poisson 
Maximum Likelihood (ML). This shows that there are no distributional assumptions; 
therefore, the dependent variable does not have to be Poisson distributed. This approach 
simplifies the first-order conditions to ease estimation and so to approximate the 
objective, therefore the name “pseudo” (or quasi). The Poisson model is given as: 
 𝑃𝑟(𝑌 = 𝑘|𝑥) =
exp⁡(−𝜆)
𝑘!
 … … … … … … (5) 
for 𝑌 ≥ 0. Where 𝜆 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝛽). The ML estimation is given as:  
 ?̂? = arg𝑚𝑎𝑥⏟    
𝛽
∑[−𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝛽) + 𝑌(𝑋𝛽) − 𝑙𝑛𝑌!]  … … … (6) 




= ∑[𝑌 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑋𝛽)]𝑋 = 0 … … … … … (7) 
These are not the real first order conditions of the log likelihood function, hence 
are “pseudo”, but they easier to calculate as the second factor is simplified. Furthermore, 
these estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal (Magerman, Studnicka, & Van 
Hove, 2016). 
232 Saima Nawaz 
6.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Estimation begins with a basic gravity model that includes only GDP, inter-
country distance, and dummies for common border, common language, and being 
landlocked. This basic gravity model is estimated by applying the PPML method and 
OLS with and without time and/or cross-section fixed effects. The use of various 
estimators and model specifications helps to ensure robustness of results. The results of 
the basic model are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Basic Gravity Model 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS FE FE FE PPML 
LN(Yi)  0.915 1.029 0.260 1.714 0.089 
 (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.05)*** (0.22)*** (0.01)*** 
LN(Yj) 1.031 1.119 1.117 1.124 0.060 
 (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.00)*** 
D(LN(PCY)) –0.285 –0.238 –0.688 –0.732 –0.039 
 (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.00)*** 
LN(D)  –1.239 –1.441 –1.925 –1.971 –0.108 
 (0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.00)*** 
LL –1.970 –1.608 –1.738 –4.390 –0.218 
 (0.16)*** (0.15)*** (0.30)*** (0.53)*** (0.03)*** 
CL –0.419 –0.569 –1.017 –1.051 –0.064 
 (0.20)** (0.21)*** (0.19)*** (0.19)*** (0.01)*** 
CB –0.046 –0.372 –0.287 –0.312 –0.021 
 (0.08) (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.00)*** 
Constant –20.279 –23.143 –3.148 –32.411 0.244 
 (0.92)*** (0.95)*** (1.29)** (4.45)*** (0.25) 
Observations 1,983 1,983 1,983 1,983 1,983 
R-squared 0.754 0.775 0.818 0.823 0.795 
Year FE NO YES NO YES YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES YES 
Source: Author’s own calculation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The estimation results reveal that the GDP has a positive and significant effect on 
bilateral trade among the given panel of countries. This shows that domestic progress i.e. 
economic development of the country is one of the major determinants of its trade 
volume. The PPML-estimated coefficients, which are elasticity estimates, are 0.089 and 
0.060 for reporting and partner countries, respectively. The estimated coefficients are 
significant at the 1 percent level (Table 4). The results reveal that a 10 percent increase in 
GDP of reporting and partner countries would lead to 0.8 percent and 0.6 percent increase 
in bilateral trade among sample countries, respectively. Various other studies have 
reported similar outcomes (Dembatapitiya & Weerahewa, 2015; Gul & Yasin, 2011; 
Iqbal & Nawaz, 2017).  
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The distance variable has a negative and significant impact on bilateral trade. The 
PPML-estimated coefficient is –0.108 and is significant at the 1 percent level implying 
that 10 percent increase in distance between two trading countries would lead to 1 percent 
reduction in bilateral trade. Numerous studies have reported similar results 
(Dembatapitiya & Weerahewa, 2015; Gul & Yasin, 2011; Iqbal & Nawaz, 2017). The 
estimated elasticity is in accordance with existing studies. Disdier and Head (2008), using 
meta-data analysis approach based on 1,467 estimates from 103 papers, conclude that the 
size of the distance effect is close to 0.9.  
The per capita income differences variable is used to study the comparative 
existence of the Linder hypothesis with reference to the Heckscher Ohlin proposition. 
The results show that per capita GDP difference variable has a significant negative 
impact on bilateral trade. The findings of a negative and statistically significant effect of 
differences in per capita income provide evidence in favour of the Linder hypothesis. The 
results indicate that the smaller the difference of per capita income between two 
countries, the bigger the volume of bilateral trade. Therefore, the more similar the 
demand structures of countries, the more they will trade with one another. The estimated 
coefficient indicates that a 10 percent reduction in GDP per capita difference between 
two countries would lead to 0.39 percent increase in bilateral trade. Numerous studies 
have supported this finding (Choi, 2002; Rauh, 2010).  
Further, the results show that the dummy for landlocked countries (LL) is 
significant and has a negative sign. This indicates that being landlocked reduces 
bilateral trade. The estimated coefficients for this dummy variable are statistically 
significant at 1 percent. The estimated result shows that bilateral trade will be 19 
percent [exp (–0.218)-1 = –0.195] lower if a country is landlocked rather than not. The 
common border (CB) dummy has a significant negative impact on trade. The 
coefficients are statistically significant at 1 percent. The estimated result shows that the 
bilateral trade is 2 percent [exp (–0.021) –1 = –0.020] lower than expected among 
countries having common border.  
Apparently, the result seems contradictory to existing literature. For example, 
Akhter and Ghani (2010) reported that bilateral trade would increase 3.22 time if member 
countries share a common border.  However, by looking at the trading pattern of 
countries having common border in South Asia, the results can be justified. For example, 
Pakistan has a common border with India and Afghanistan. However, trade with these 
countries, especially India, is restricted due to non-tariff barriers due to political conflicts, 
institutional hurdles, and procedural requirements. Further, much of the border trade 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India is underground and unrecorded. 
These factors led to a negative impact of common border on bilateral trade. Gul and 
Yasin (2011) and Iqbal and Nawaz (2017) also find similar results.  
To quantify the impact of regional integration: SAFTA, the gravity model is 
augmented and re-estimated using both the PPML estimator and OLS with fixed effects. 
The results are presented in Table 5. The impact of all basic variables including GDP, 
distance, LL, CB and CL on bilateral trade remain same as shown in Table 4. The 
empirical analysis now shows that the regional integration has a negative and significant 
association with bilateral trade among sample countries. This implies that SAFTA, a 
regional  trade  agreement  among  South Asian countries,  may not  produce  the  desired  
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Table 5 
Institutions and Regional Integration Augmented Gravity Model 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
FE FE FE FE PPML PPML PPML 
LN(Yi)  0.895 1.044 1.043 1.026 0.056 0.056 0.055 
 (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
LN(Yj) 0.981 1.108 1.108 1.092 0.059 0.059 0.058 
 (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
D(LN(PCY)) -0.179 -0.341 -0.355 -0.328 -0.017 -0.017 -0.006 
 (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
LN(D)  -1.427 -1.439 -1.455 -1.494 -0.084 -0.085 -0.084 
 (0.06)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.07)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
LL -1.517 -1.024 -1.009 -1.038 -0.057 -0.054 -0.074 
 (0.12)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.14)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
CL -0.666 -0.543 -0.557 -0.561 -0.038 -0.038 -0.037 
 (0.17)*** (0.21)*** (0.21)*** (0.16)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
CB -0.533 -0.246 -0.251 -0.311 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.11)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
RI_SAFTA  -1.006   -0.448 -0.023 -0.192 0.075 
 (0.11)***   (0.11)*** (0.01)*** (0.10)* (0.07) 
INSSR  1.690  1.587 0.080 0.072  
  (0.18)***  (0.15)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***  
INSSP       0.066 
       (0.01)*** 
INSWR   1.749     
   (0.17)***     
RI * INSSR       0.048  
      (0.03)*  
RI * INSSR         0.029 
       (0.02)* 
Constant -16.192 -29.549 -29.627 -27.876 0.445 0.397 0.527 
 (0.82)*** (1.14)*** (1.11)*** (1.04)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.06)*** 
Observations 1,983 1,983 1,983 1,983 1,983 1,983 1,983 
R-squared 0.743 0.789 0.790 0.791 0.765 0.765 0.763 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Source: Author’s own calculation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
results i.e. boosting bilateral trade. Some recent studies have also concluded that SAFTA 
failed to create a significant increase in intra-regional trade in the South Asian region 
(Dembatapitiya & Weerahewa, 2015; Iqbal & Nawaz, 2017). This shows that South Asia 
may not be able to reap the potential benefits of economic integration through trade at 
their full potential. These results are supported by recent studies (Iqbal and Nawaz, 
2017).  
Why has this region failed to achieve the benefits of its trade agreement? Is 
SAFTA irrelevant? To probe these questions, this study extends the model to control for 
the quality of the institutional framework. To quantify the role of institutional setup in the 
country, an institutional quality index (INS) is constructed as explained in section 5. Two 
types of indices are constructed; one with simple average of all indicators (INSs) and 
other with weighted average (INSw). Furthermore, (INSs) is incorporated in the model in 
two ways: (i) institutional quality index for the reporter country (INSjt) and (ii) 
institutional quality index for the partner country (INSjt).  
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The institutions augmented gravity model estimation results are reported in 
columns (2)-(7) of Table 5. The estimation results show that INS have a significant 
positive direct impact on bilateral trade. The estimated coefficients range from 0.08 to 
0.66. This indicates that a 10 percent increase in institutional quality would lead to .8 
percent to 0.6 percent increase in bilateral trade in case of PPML estimator. However, 
estimated coefficients are very high in case of fixed effect (from 1.7 to 1.5). This implies 
that supportive institutions are necessary to promote bilateral trade. Furthermore, impact 
of reporter country institutions (INSSR) is relatively higher (0.072) as compared to partner 
country institutions (INSSP) (0.066). 
To assess the complementarity between regional integration and institutions, 
interactive terms of regional integration and institutions (𝑅𝐼 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑆) are added in the 
model. Two different interactions are included; namely (𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡) ∗ ln⁡(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡) and (𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡) ∗
ln⁡(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑗𝑡) that capture the interaction of regional integration with reporter country 
institutions and partner country institutions, respectively. The results are reported in 
model 6 and 7 in Table 5. The result shows that the interaction term have a positive and 
significant impact on bilateral trade. This implies that institutional arrangements play an 
important role in ensuring the effectiveness of regional trade agreements. We know from 
the estimation result that the coefficient on (𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡) ∗ ln⁡(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡) is positive implying that 
the reductive effect declines as the quality of institutions increases.  
However, Brambor, et al. (2006) shows that it is incorrect to decide on the 
inclusion of the interactive term simply by looking at the significance of the coefficient of 
the interactive variable. The marginal effect of SAFTA on bilateral trade should be 
observed by constructing confidence intervals for the estimates of coefficient of SAFTA 
and interactive term of SAFTA and institutions over the possible values of the 
institutions. The solid sloping line in Figure 2 indicates how the marginal effect of 
SAFTA changes with the increase in institutional quality. The confidence intervals 
around the line allow us to determine the condition under which institutions have a 
statistically significant effect on the bilateral trade – they have a statistically significant 
effect whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are both above (or 
below) the zero line (Brambor et al., 2006).  
 
Fig. 2.  Determining the Range of Significance of the Marginal Effect of RI*INS 
Reporter country INS Partner country INS 
  
Note: Author’s own formulation based on model 6 & 7 reported in Table 5.  
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In Figure 2 the marginal effect of SAFTA on bilateral trade against different value 
of institutions is shown. It can be observed that significant contribution of SAFTA is only 
possible when institutional quality is sufficiently high. This implies that the 
complementary association should be considered with caution as the association yields 
positive trade only when the quality of institutions become very high. The estimated 
coefficient of interaction term is small as compared to coefficient of SAFTA.  
Well defined institutions provide a pathway to implement required reforms and 
channelise resources needed for bilateral trade. A well-defined institutional framework helps 
to implement in practice the agreements reached in principle in an RTA. Iqbal and Nawaz 
(2017) also provide grounds to argue that “SAFTA is not effective in promoting trade due to 
low institutional quality and stringent non-institutional arrangements, including high tariff 
along with low physical infrastructure. Both SAFTA and MFN can only contribute to bilateral 
trade significantly, if complemented by institutional framework”.  
Apart from the overall institutional quality index, individual indicators of the 
various dimensions of institutional quality can also be used to gauge the contribution of 
the institutional framework to bilateral trade volume. The results based on PPML 
estimator are reported in Tables 6 & 7. The estimation results show that all dimensions of 
institutional quality have a positive and significant impact on bilateral trade. Control over 
corruption (CC) and government effectiveness (GE) make a relatively higher contribution 
to trade volume, whereas rule of law (RL), regulatory quality (RQ) and political stability 
and absence of violence/terrorism (PA) make a relatively low contribution.  
 
Table 6 
Institutions and Regional Integration Augmented Gravity Model:  
Components of Institutions (PPML Estimator) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝐺𝐸 𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝑃𝐴 𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐿 𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝑄 𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝑉𝐴 
LN(Yi) 0.056 0.055 0.057 0.056 0.057 0.055 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
LN(Yj) 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.059 0.059 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
D(LN(PCY))  -0.021 -0.024 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.012 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
LN(D) -0.086 -0.089 -0.090 -0.082 -0.087 -0.086 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
LL -0.073 -0.047 -0.071 -0.055 -0.055 -0.076 
 (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
CL -0.044 -0.049 -0.039 -0.040 -0.042 -0.037 
 (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
CB -0.021 -0.021 -0.031 -0.021 -0.025 -0.028 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
RI_SAFTA  -0.168 -0.344 -0.053 -0.154 -0.297 -0.429 
 (0.11) (0.11)*** (0.03)* (0.09)* (0.11)*** (0.13)*** 
INSSR 0.286 0.299 0.085 0.190 0.203 0.009 
 (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02) 
RI * INSSR  0.043 0.093 0.010 0.038 0.075 0.108 
 (0.03) (0.03)*** (0.01) (0.02)* (0.03)** (0.03)*** 
Constant 0.630 0.642 0.693 0.626 0.621 0.771 
 (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)*** 
Observations 1,983 1,983 1,873 1,983 1,983 1,983 
R-squared 0.770 0.777 0.764 0.766 0.773 0.758 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Source: Author’s own calculation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7 
Institutions and Regional Integration Augmented Gravity Model: 
Components of Institutions (PPML Estimator) 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝐺𝐸 𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝑃𝐴 𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝐿 𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝑅𝑄 𝐼𝑁𝑆_𝑉𝐴 
𝐿𝑁(𝑌𝑖) 0.056 0.057 0.056 0.055 0.056 0.054 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
𝐿𝑁(𝑌𝑗) 0.059 0.057 0.060 0.058 0.060 0.059 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
𝐷(𝐿𝑁(𝑃𝐶𝑌)) -0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.013 
 (0.00)** (0.00) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
𝐿𝑁(𝐷) -0.086 -0.087 -0.090 -0.083 -0.085 -0.080 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
𝐿𝐿 -0.070 -0.060 -0.073 -0.072 -0.072 -0.086 
 (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
𝐶𝐿 -0.041 -0.048 -0.036 -0.039 -0.041 -0.033 
 (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
𝐶𝐵 -0.025 -0.022 -0.032 -0.021 -0.024 -0.022 
 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
𝑅𝐼_𝑆𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐴 -0.104 -0.128 -0.006 0.036 -0.071 0.040 
 (0.06)* (0.08)* (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)* (0.08) 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑃 0.214 0.251 0.089 0.184 0.180 0.094 
 (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
𝑅𝐼 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑃 0.037 0.032 -0.009 -0.018 0.032 -0.021 
 (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)* (0.02) 
Constant 0.661 0.685 0.719 0.678 0.662 0.717 
 (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** 
Observations 1,983 1,983 1,870 1,983 1,983 1,983 
R-squared 0.763 0.772 0.762 0.765 0.768 0.759 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Source: Author’s own calculation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Interesting findings emerge from the interactive term. We find that government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and accountability dimensions have relatively higher 
complementary contribution in making regional integration effective. All these 
dimensions, linked with proper implementation of policy, reform agenda especially 
agreed during trade agreements. The purpose of regional integration is to facilitate trade 
by reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers. The reduction in these barriers is only possible 
when domestic institutions ensure the implementation of policies.  
 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The present study has investigated the role of the institutional framework in 
explaining the effectiveness of trade agreements to promote bilateral trade in South Asia 
using an institutions-augmented gravity model. The empirical analysis is performed using 
OLS with fixed effects and the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation 
technique for panel of 11 countries over the period 1996-2015.  
There are two important findings of the empirical analysis: First, the estimation 
has confirmed for this panel of South Asian economies, the gravity model’s prediction 
that economic development and trade costs are two key determinants of bilateral trade. 
There is a natural growth of bilateral trade linked with economic development of the 
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country. Conversely, in the case of these South Asian economies, the normally positive 
“common border” effect has not been confirmed, possibly owing to political conflicts, 
especially those between Pakistan and India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and India and 
Nepal. These conflicts undermine the natural trade potential.  
Second, the empirical analysis has shown that regional integration is not in itself 
effective in promoting bilateral trade. The estimated impact of SAFTA—a regional trade 
agreement of South Asian economies has a negative impact on bilateral trade. To look at 
the underlying reasons behind the estimated negative impact of SAFTA, this study has 
investigated the role of institutions. The findings have revealed that institutions have a 
direct as well as indirect impact on bilateral trade. Institutions, indirectly, complement the 
regional integration.  
The RTA can create regional trade if supported by institutional framework. More 
specifically, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and accountability are the key 
institutions to establish the efficacy of regional trade agreements. Without supportive 
institutions, the RTA may not produce desired results as evident in the case of SAFTA 
progress over the last 10 years. Moreover, the complementary association should be 
considered with caution. The association yields positive trade only when the quality of 
institutions becomes very high.  
Various policy implications emerged from empirical analysis: First, economic 
development, being the key determinant of bilateral trade, begs continuous investment by the 
public as well as private sectors to promote bilateral trade. The government should focus on 
the development of key infrastructures both physical and soft, to reduce trade costs that 
negatively affect bilateral trade. In recent decades, development of physical infrastructure is 
the hallmark of geo-spatial transformation to promote bilateral trade. Economic corridors like 
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the best example to reduce trade cost. The 
core of CPEC is to reduce trade cost and hence enhance bilateral trade.  
Second, institutional reform is essential to reap the potential benefits of regional 
trade agreements. Based on empirical analysis, it can be argued that regional trade 
agreements can only be effective when these are supported by a well-defined institutional 
framework. The success of EU is the best example to support the role of institutions. To 
conclude, South Asian countries should focus on institutional reforms to reap the benefits 
of regional trade agreements.  
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